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In the historiography of colonialism one occasionally comes across 
characterization, direct or oblique, of political and even labor relations as 
paternalist. The behavior of the colonial state in enacting protective 
legislation, exhorting employers to take an active interest in their workmen's 
welfare, and expressing the desire to protect the 'native' from the peril of 
'detribalisation' constitute a case in point. 
R.C. Jerrard, a European entrepreneur of 25 years' standing in Tanganyika, 
wrote a twenty-five page treatise in 1937 on the "care and management of 
African labor" which would appear to lend substance to the paternalist model 
of colonial labor relations. The African worker, he cautioned, had to be 
approached with patience in order to win his confidence. But once this was 
done, the European employer would more likely than not find the African worker 
as pleasant and as hard working as any worker in Europe. Yet the African, in 
the nature of things, was to be treated like a different breed of workman. 
Like a child, his handling demanded a delicate balance between firmness and 
affection. 
The Afri'Can worker, Mr. Jerrard advised, needed firm supervision for 
"there is very little that the native can be left to do withou•t proper 
supervision." He took his time to do things, and yet he did not take kindly to 
being driven. The employer should not hesitate to give a reprimand to his 
worker when necessary, but he must always keep his temper under control. If he 
must ridicule him, only "judicious ridicule" would produce good results. The 
African loved humour and if th.is could be brought to punctuate interaction 
between the Europen employer and his African workers, so much the better. Like 
a naughty child who was likely to play with fire, the African laborer needed 
to be carefully watched and protected, especially where dangerous or valuable 
articles were concerned. He was daredevil enough to tamper with dangerous 
machinery. Money or explosives should not be left lying about when an African 
is around, for "boys will be boys all the world over and these African lads 
are just as bad as our own children. If you must have these things, keep them 
locked up .• " 
.The ideal labor relations in a colonial African situation should, 
according to Jerrard, be adorned with personal contact, affection and trust. 
The European employer was well advised to cultivate acquaintance with his 
African worker, but he must set judicious limits, for "too much familiarity 
breeds contempt. 11 His conduct must be exemplary, "avoiding any behaviour in 
front of him (the African worker) which might tend to damage his respect for 
you." The European employer should do all he can to promote his African 
laborers' welfare and happiness. He must educate the natives into habits of 
cleanliness, feed them well and provide them with proper and adequate medical 
care when it was needed.1 
Like John Stuart Mill almost a century before him, Jerrard was 
articulating a "traditional conception of authority" appropriate to a feudal 
setting. It is probably instructive to recall Mill's words on the contemporary 
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percept ion of relations between the higher classes and the common people in 
pre-industrial England: 
The relation between rich and poor should be only 
partially authoritative; it should be amiable, moral and 
sentimental; affectionate tutelage on the one side, 
respectful and grateful deference on the other. The rich 
should be in loco parentis to the poor guiding and 
restraining them like children.2 
like pre-industrial England . which Mill was commenting 
its lack of fully-fledged capitalist relations of 
therefore expect to find paternalism in colonial 
The colonial world, 
upo~, was noted for 
production. One might 
enterprises. 
There were as.pects of colonial enterprise which could be referred to as 
external manifestations of paternalism: provision to labor of "free" 
acconnnodation, food rations, cooking facilities, medical care, recreational 
amenities, and, in the case of contract labor, clothing and bedding. The mine 
compound, organized on the basis of workers' ethnic groups, with 
company-sponsored tribal headmen, 'traditional courts' and so on might also be 
viewed in this light. The crucial question; however, is: to what extent did 
these external manifestations reflect the concrete reality of paternalism in 
colonial labor relations? 
Mr. Jerrard's model might have been appropriate for a domestic employment 
situation where the European employer could afford to play patrician vis-a-vis 
his African 'plebs'. But the situation in capitalist agriculture and industry 
was not conducive to the realization of such a model of employment, at least 
not the substance of it. Here the inexorable laws of capitalism came into full 
play. They were tainted by pre-capitalist elements, to be sure, but entrepre-
neurial ideology, underpinned by the urge to maximize profits, had the upper 
hand. The African worker was hardly an object of his employer's paternal love 
and affection. Labour in colonial enterprise, as much as in any other 
capitalist undertaking, was a crucial factor of production whose cost 
determined, to a large degree, the success or failure of any enterprise. Its 
cost needed to be minimized as much as was humanly possible in pursuit of 
profit maximization. Such 'paternalist' features as there were simply 
reflected the contradictions of a precapitalist milieu in which capitalist 
enterprise operated. The cash nexus in this environment was, not firmly 
entrenched. What may have appeared as perquisites or acts of protection simply 
served a 'social control' function. These were practical solutions designed to 
deal with such problems as high labor turnovers, absenteeism, lack of 
motivation, and the ever-present threat of labor rebellion. 
The main argument of this paper on the life and labor of the African 
mineworkers in Tanganyika between the early years of the Great Depression and 
the end of colonial rule is that the quest for profit maximization rather than 
an imaginary paternal benevolence on the part of the employers was central in 
determining labor conditions. Entrepreneurial cost-consciousness which in this 
respect entailed the urge not only to minimize labor costs but also to 
maximize labor output constituted the most important feature of profit 
maximization. The laws of capitalism, however, do operate within the 
frameworks of concrete historical situations. Our analysis must therefore pay 
due attention to the factors which mediated the Tanganyika mine owners' quest 
for profit maximization with regard to their treatment of their workers. In 
this regard, three factors are of particular importance. First is the notable 
diversity of the Tanganyika mining industry; second is what we may refer to as 
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the racial factor of labor relations on the mines; and third is the 
intervention of the state. 
I have given an historical outline of the development of mining in 
Tanganyika elsewhere,3 but it might be of assistance to our analysis to 
point out its salient features. By the Depression period most of the mining 
properties formerly owned by German firms had been brought back into 
production and additional mineral deposits of significant potential had been 
located and some of them were already being exploited. In the period covered 
by this study eight different mineral products were produced in different 
parts of the country. The Lake Victoria Zone, to the north, itself an area of 
considerable geographical diversity, produced gold, diamonds, ·wolfram or 
tungsten, and tin (from reef and alluvial deposits). The southern zone 
produced reef and alluvial gold, and carried within its depths proven coal 
deposits whose exploitation awaited (and still awaits) the development of a 
transport infrastructure. Central Tanganyika produced gold at the Sekenke mine 
which, it is said, contributed significantly to the German local financing of 
the First World War. The western zone was fairly rich in gold, lead, mica and 
salt. The Morogoro region in the east has been producing mica since the German 
days. Operations in the industry ranged from sizeable companies with an 
international connection to individual owner operators who maintained a 
precarious existence. 
The diversity of the industry and how it affected the condition of labor 
should now be apparent. The geographical location of a mine is an important 
factor, for example, where transportation facilities , ecological conditions 
and the nature of the surrounding economy and society was likely to have 
affected availability of food and other supplies, as well as the social life 
of labor. No less important is the nature of the mineral deposit in question 
and its method of recovery which largely determined the working conditions. It 
will be shown, for example that working conditions in alluvial mining were 
radically different from those in reef or lode mining. The type of mineral 
product and its price movements on the world market determined to a large 
degree the wage rates and the levels of other types of expenditure on labor. 
The size of an enterprise, with the extent to which it could command financial 
resources, was another important element of diversity. The large international 
mining firms, able to draw· on experiences in the southern part of the 
continent and elsewhere, managed their labor in styles which the small 
owner-operators, most of whose horizons "never went beyond the day after 
tomorrow," could hardly ever emulate. The time-scale of an operation was also 
important in determining the conditions experienced by its labor force. 
Different mining claims were discovered, developed, and went into production 
at different points in time. Many firms in their early stages of development 
or production, before they were on a sound financial footing, tended to reduce 
outlays on labor to their lowest possible levels. However, there were 
differences: between, for example, on the one hand, a resource-endowed 
international mining firm which perceived its prospects in an operation, 
however early, to be good and, on the other hand, a self-financing operation 
whose 'bread and butter' solely depended on the proceeds of that operation. 
These diverse forces produced diverse experiences. 
The employers' profit motive and cost consciousness were embellished by a 
racist ideology and general beliefs about the inherent inferiority of the 
African. This factor impinged upon the manner in which they sought to minimize 
their labor costs. Convinced as they were about the primitive nature of living 
conditions in the African traditional environment, they had no problem in 
rationalizing the poor wages, rations, housing and other conditions which 
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their African laborers endured. European foremen, brought up within an 
industrial work culture characterized by supervised time thrift and 
synchronized labor were impatient with African pre-industrial notions of work 
based on self-supervized 'task-orientation'. They were wont to conjuring up 
the figure of the 'lazy native'. Their treatment of labor under their control 
tended to be highly authoritarian, patently crude, and often violent. 
In a significant cont.:ibution to the debate on the colonial state, B ,J. 
Berman and J.M. Lonsdale argue that as well as being the ultimate 
institutional apparatus for ensuring the reproduction and accumulation of 
capital, the state is, at the same time, the ultimate agency of political 
reproduction, ''maintaining the pattern of class domination and subordination." 
The latter function imposes upon the state the logic of having to assume the 
appearance of an impartial arbiter between contending interests,4 The 
intervention of the Tanganyika colonial state in attempting to regulate labor 
conditions in the mining industry could correctly be viewed in this light. 
The colonial state, needless to say, is not a monolithic phenomenon, In 
non-settler colonies, as was Tanganyika, colonial regimes, unencumbered by 
settler capitalist political power, were often at pains in claiming the 
pursuit of the interests of the 'native' vis-a-vis those of his employer, In 
reality, however, the need to attract investment by promoting the 
profitability of capital was central to their behaviour. In this respect, 
state intervention in economic management was transparently partia 1. In the 
case of the Tanganyika mining industry such protective legislation as there 
was on behalf of the workers was often inadequate or of a token nature, and 
the state relied on moral suasion rather than compulsion for its 
implementation. The obverse side of the same coin is that the state invariably 
employed coercion to force the African workers in the industry to fulfil their 
part of the 'bargain'. 
The Labor Process 
Experience regarding conditions of work was extremely diverse. It ranged, 
on one end, from the large mines where labor intensity was carefully measured, 
work categories elaborately defined, and labor closely and effectively 
supervised to, on the other end, the alluvial mine fields where labor gangs 
were undifferentiated, and self-supervision was the order of the day. A second 
important observation is that in general Tanganyikan mineworkers before World 
War II were largely confined to unskilled jobs, except for certain categories 
of underground work. Skilled labor was supplied by Europeans and Asians or 
non-Tanganyikan Africans, especially those from Central Africa. After World 
War I I, especially during the 1950s, a significant number of Tanganyikans 
began to perform certain categories of skilled jobs. This development was 
partly a function of increasing mechanization at some of the larger mines and 
partly an index of increasing differentiation among the Tanganyikan 
wage-earners, itself a reflection of the fairly advanced state of wage labor 
as a system. 
Interesting work has already been done on the nature of work in the mining 
industries of a number of African countries,5 Conditions here were not 
dissimilar to those at most of the Tanganyika mines. In this section I shall 
seek to delineate the major forms of labor control and exploitation within a 
work situation. Secondly, I hope to make some original contribution regarding 
work in alluvial mining where little work has been done. 
In the settled mines, as opposed to the ever-shifting alluvial mine 
claims, both the size and gradation of the labor force depended on the scale 
of operation. The smaller reef gold properties of Musoma and the Lupa or the 
Karagwe tin field and most of the Morogoro mica mines, carrying out mining 
with hardly any mechanized operations, employed small labor gangs who worked 
largely under the supervision of African nyamparas, Some of these could afford 
to employ one or two skilled Europeans or Asians to superintend operations in 
the crucial mining and ore treatment departments. Otherwise, the owners 
superintended the operations themselves, Since they ran small labor camps, 
providing therefore minimal services, owners of these small mines employed 
little labor outside the production department: a . few sanitary workers, a 
handful of general laborers, usually on a casual basis, and probably a junior 
clerk and a storekeeper, 
Starved of capital resources, these mines employed an assortment of 
primitive, usually manual, equipment and engaged large proportions of 
unskilled labor, or at best labor with only rudiments of training, most of it 
on the job, As a result owners of these small mines depended for their 
profits, such as they were, on lengthening the working day as much as they 
possibly could, The evidence in hand indicates that the normal working day 
before 1950 was almost literally from dawn to dusk, On.the Karagwe tinfield 
in 1939 work began at 5:30 in the morning till 5 or 6 in the evening, after 
which the men were supposed to fetch their daily rations from the employers' 
stores, collect firewood a,:,d water and cook their only meal of the day, 6 
Around the same period it was found out on the Musoma goldfileld that owners 
of smal 1 mine properties frequently called out their men to work on Sundays 
but paid no special Sunday over-time rates, 7 In summary, three inter-re lated 
factors dictated the manner in which surplus value was extracted. These were: 
the nature and extent of a mineral deposit, the methods of its extraction, and 
the resources commanded by a mine owner. In these small mines extraction of 
'absolute surplus value', based on lengthening the working day, was the 
norm,8 Such a state of affairs is indicative of the low level of the 
development of the forces of production. As we shall see below, it was here 
that. both wages and living conditions for mineworkers were extremely poor. 
The larger mining properties, notably the Mwadui diamond mine, the Geita, 
Sekenke, Buhemba, Kiabakari and Saza gold mines, and the Mpanda lead mine, 
invested in substantial plant and equipment, especially after World War II. By 
the early 1950s most of the processes in ore extraction, traction and 
treatment were mechanized. The companies also ran regulated townships in which 
they provided varying ranges of services to their employees. As mechanization 
increased, and as the townships expanded and with them the services provided, 
job categories multiplied and differentiation within the mines' labor forces 
intensified. 
Needless to say, these mines went through different stages of development 
before they would achieve high levels of technological advancement. At 
Williamson's Mwadui diamond mine, which opened in 1940, development work was 
greatly hampered by the War. Mining and gravel treatment were carried out by 
simple hand techniques with tools mostly locally purchased. It was not until 
1946 that Williamson was able to embark upon a program of expansion and 
technical modernization.9 In the mid-1930s Sekenke gold mine, the most 
mechanized mine at the time, employed only two air-compressed rock drills 
operated by experienced miners from Northern Rhodesia. For the most part the 
ore was worked by 'hammer boys' who used hand drills. Delivery of mined ore to 
the pit surface depended largely on human rather than mechanical power. The 
water pumping system was so inefficient that work underground was carried out 
in wet uncomfortable conditions. IO By the end of the War the larger mines 
were doing much better than this, technologically speaking, 
In 1956 Williamson Diamonds Ltd. at Mwadui celebrated its ten years of 
technical innovation with the completion of a large new heavy media separation 
plant, designed to treat up to 7,500 tons of gravel a day. It was fed by a 
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10,000-foot long conveyor belt which transported the gravels from the 
open-cast workings where the principal excavator unit was an electrically 
operated 'walking drag line'. Other types of mechanical excavation equipment 
were also at work. In the following year the company embarked upon an 
ambitious program of underground development and diamond drilling.11 In its 
racially segregated township the company provided a wide range of services to 
its employees and their families. Williamson Diamonds was evidently a large 
enterprise with a complex system of labor management. 
In the late 1950s Williamson Diamonds began a job evaluation exercise the 
results of which indicate the existence of a highly differentiated labor 
force. The company identified nine broad job categories of daily paid African 
employees in the mining (underground and surface), prospecting, treatment, 
engineering (including transport), township and administration departments, 
each of the departments with several occupational groups of varying skills and 
experiences. In mining, for example, there were drillers, blasters-, operators 
of excavators, drivers, las hers, timberm.en, banksmen, general laborers, a 
clerk and a storeman. The African compound administration controlled 
maintenance artisans and laborers, cleaners, shop attendants, security guards, 
storemen, tailors, cooks, bar waiters, and administrative assistants and 
clerks. The wage rates ranged from sh. 5.50 in category one to sh. 25.00 in 
category nine. Besides, there was a small number of 'senior' African employees 
on monthly rates.12 Mwadui was of course the largest mine in the territory. 
The other mines cannot be expected to have operated as complex a system of 
labor management as that of Mwadui, but there were many similarities. 
By the late 1930s the larger mines were operating 8-hour work shifts. 
There are some indications that the average working day in the earlier period 
was considerably longer, but the evidence is scanty. Any over-time or Sunday 
work was paid a special over-time rate. But labor was strictly controlled and 
closely supervised. In the regulated compounds labor was restricted in 
movement and in some cases even subjected to a military-style discipline as a 
way of extracting maximum work performance. On the enclosed property of Mwadui 
workers could only go out over the weekends. This was aimed partly at 
combating absenteeism and partly at minimizing chances of diamond 
smuggling.13 At the Geita mine workers were awakened by a siren just before 
dawn, and the distribution of work was preceded by a military-style parade on 
the central grounds of the compound commanded by the company sergeant 
major.14 At every entry point to important production departments at Mwadui 
- the power house, the heavy media separation plant, the mine workings, the 
boiler shop and so on - there was a check post manned by a supervisor who 
checked identity documents and barred from entry workers who reported after 
the siren went, or refused exit to those who wanted to leave before the end of 
the shift.15 
The outstanding feature of mine work in the bigger mines was white 
supervision to which every African worker was subject. Most of the white 
supervisors tended to be miners and artisans with work experience in the 
Southern and Central African mining industry. In some cases direct supervision 
was carried out by African nyamparas, but there was always some white overseer 
around the corner who exercised final authority at the place of work. 
Employers needed the white supervisors partly because of their skills and 
experience in mining and related jobs and partly because of the employers' 
belief that, if left unsupervised by Europeans, Africans were more likely than 
not to loaf around or do shoddy work.16 
Interviews with former mineworkers on white supervision evoke memories of 
terror and mutual hatred. Supervisors often addressed their work subordinates 
in obscene language, drawing on a repertoire of opprobrious, and usually 
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racist terms and epithets. They kicked the laborers about and sometimes 
flogged them with hippopotamus whips, which was against the law. On numerous 
occasions African laborers were provoked into fighting back, and violent 
racial confrontations at work constituted a feature of mining life.17 At the 
Mwadui diamond mine a trade union leader recounted incidents in 1960 to 
illustrate mistreatment of African workers by their white supervisors. A Mr. 
King had kicked the ration bread of an African employee and later 
contemptuously given him a shilling in compensation. At the HMS, the gravel 
treatment plant, an African was booted by a European supervisor because he had 
accidentally caused soil to touch the supervisor's trousers .18 Occasionally, 
especially from the late 1950s, aggrieved workers would complain to management 
but usually no action was taken. Only a sustained campaign by the Tanganyika 
Mine Workers' Union from 1959 onwards evoked some response. 
Like in many other employment centres in colonial Africa, mineworkers were 
assessed and paid on the basis of the labor card system, known as the kipande 
in Ea st Africa. Payment was made on completion of 30 days' work, each day's 
work being recorded on the card by the supervisor. According to the courts' 
interpretation of the relevant sections of the Master and Native Servants 
Ordinance, once a laborer started work on the kipande, it became a binding 
contract until he finished his 30 days' work, which he had to do within 60 
days. Continuous absence from work for 4 days was an offense. The kipande was 
popularly referred to as the poor man's way of working. It was both a symbol 
and an instrument of labor exploitation and oppression, and also served as a 
means of imposing work discipline. Supervisors would erase or refuse to enter 
on the card a day's work as a sanction for a whole range of 'offences', 
including reporting late for duty, loitering, refusal to obey orders, shoddy 
work, failure to complete a task, saucy conduct towards a supervisor and so 
on. Supervisors enjoyed absolute power over their subordinates in this respect 
and recorded or deducted days from the cards according to their whims and 
fancies. A day not entered on the card would earn no wages and no noma ticket 
for the daily ration. Unfair wage deduction by means of the kipande system was 
one of the major gri.evances frequently expressed by the workers.19 Sometimes 
employers attempted to retain labor by deferring payment on completed labor 
cards.20 
Except for the alluvial mines, mining accidents constituted the scourge of 
life on the mines. I am presently in the initial stages of a systematic study 
of the accidents but there is already an indication that they were quite 
frequent and in some cases extensive. Underground work was naturally the most 
dangerous, with deaths and injuries resulting from accidental detonation of 
explosives during ore blasting, collapse of mine roofs, sudden falling of rock 
and inundation of mines. Former workers at the Geita mine indicated that an 
average of 3 deaths, due mainly to mining accidents, occurred daily. A man who 
worked there between 1948 and 1951 estimated that some 200 people died in 
mining accidents while he was there. The company had full-time employees whose 
job was to bury the dead. Gold came to be associated with majini spirits, and 
often workers took underground with them magic medicine as protection against 
accidents.21 
There were situations where accidents were inevitable, for example in the 
case of an unexpected innundation of a mine. In most cases, however, the 
frequency of the accidents reflected either the reluctance of the mine owners 
to invest resources in ensuring maximum safety, because that would erode their 
profits, or a lack of technical know how on the part of management, or a 
combination of both. Most accidents on the Karagwe tinfield were attributed to 
tributors who were totally unschooled in the scientific methods of mining and 
were starved of resources to invest in safety.22 Some miners also suffered 
the long-term effects of mine work by contracting diseases connected with 
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mining some of which were fatal, Silicosis caused by the inhaling of rock dust 
and pneumonia, sometimes resulting from working in a wet, poorly drained mine, 
are ready examples. 
The work situation on the Lupa alluvial gold field, discovered in 1922, 
was radically different from that which obtained on the settled mines. 
Alluvial gold mining entailed the recovery of gold originally eroded from the 
parent rock and later deposited in plateaux and river valleys, The most common 
recovery process consisted in the washing of alluvium with water using pans 
(panning) or sluice boxes (sluicing) and then picking the small residue of 
gold by hand, The collection of working tools consisted only of pans or sluice 
boxes, bars and shovels. Alluvial mining was therefore suitable for 'smal 1 
men' of small means in search of a fortune, should they come across a lucky 
strike. Gangs of workmen under one employer ranged from 5 to 100, depending on 
the size of a claim. 
In the early stages of alluvial mining on the Lupa work was restricted to 
the banks of the larger streams in dry season. The working unit was a small 
gang of men using a sluice-box under the supervision of an African kapitao. 
Few diggers, i.e. employers, visited their claims to supervise workmen, Work 
came to a standstill in wet season when the river banks became flooded. As the 
main river banks got exhausted of their gold deposits and as the search for 
gold took a frantic turn, especially during the Depression, small streams, 
creeks and storm drains were invaded for gold. Deposits here were scattered 
and patchy, but of payable value. In this phase gold was mainly won by 
panning. The 'panning boy' , working on his own, became the working unit. 
Prospecting and winning (actual mining) were largely done by unsupervised 
panners trusting to luck and distribution for their finds. Wet season work 
assumed major importance. To beat water shortage in dry season some employers 
employed the 'dry-blower', driven by a petrol engine, to extract gold from dry 
earth dug from dry ravines and storm drains, filled up valleys and mbugas. 
Each dry blower was attended by a group of about 35 men who naturally worked 
under supervision. Since dry blowers required considerable capital, few 
diggers employe.d them, The typical worker in the industry during our period, 
therefore, remained the unsupervised panning boy.23 
Apart from the daily rate, based on the working day, the alluvial gold 
workers in panning and sluicing were paid a bonus, locally known as the prizi, 
based on the amount of gold recovered per day. The standard rate was 20 cents 
for every pennyweight of gold, though in periods of serious labor shortage, 
employers outbade one another by paying higher rates. In a situation of 
unsupervised labor, the prizi also served the function of motivating the 
workers to expend maximum energy on the field in order to recover as much gold 
as possible. But it was also common for the unsupervised laborers to sell gold 
to illegal dealers or to other employers who paid higher prizi rates. 
Sometimes workmen, in order to maximize their prizis, dug for gold on claims 
.belonging to other diggers. The bonus system, as a result, often aroused much 
controversy among the diggers and between government and the diggers,24 
By the late 1930s alluvial gold on the Lupa was difficult to come by and 
economical operation had a much greater element of chance than in earlier 
days. Early in 1942 diggers introduced the 'quarter' system whereby a laborer 
had to return a minimum weight of gold in order to get two days marked on his 
kipande. The priz i was paid only for gold over and above this minimum. Gold 
below the required minimum weight earned no wages and no food ration. The 
diggers claimed that the system was designed "to get an honest day's work out 
of a laborer and to prevent pure loafing." Government found the new system 
reprehensible inasmuch as diggers were attempting to pass the gamble of 
finding gold on the laborer, thus encouraging gold theft and illegal digging 
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on other people's claims, But government never effectively intervened in the 
relations between diggers and their men, Most probably, therefore, some 
diggers got away with its implementation,25 By the 1950s most of the 
expatriate diggers had left and, increasingly, the . little gold recovered on 
the wpa was won by workers organized in co-operatives. 
Living Conditions on the Settled Mines 
The quality of living conditions on the smaller, less valuable mines, 
operating on meagre resources, was obviously inferior to that on the richer 
mines. Some were better than others but, on the whole, wages, rations, 
housing, sanitation, health and other facilities were extremely poor. Most 
employers depended on a single small mine and could only invest in worker's 
welfare purely on the basis of returns from the mine, They would usually give 
investment priority to physical means of production, especially ore treatment 
machinery, 
Only medium-size mines ran rather regulated camps, employing a camp 
policeman or two to run them, The camps in most of the small mines were rather 
informal, with poor, or even dilapidated, housing and bad or no sanitation. 
From a third to half of the labor force lived out of camp, More than 80 per 
cent of the twenty or so Musoma mines inspected in 1939 fell into this 
category, The standard laborers' housing consisted of either grass huts or 
wattle and daub thatched 1rondavels', 12 to 15 feet in diameter, standing 10 
yards apart. Each of the small huts accommodated up to 8 men or more. Few 
mines had regular married quarters, and when they did, two families or more 
shared a rondavel. At. most of the mines sanitation was conspicuously absent. 
There was usually no piped water, Trench or pit latrine accommodation was 
sometimes provided, but there were no screens between seats, and latrines were 
usually so dirty that workmen preferred fouling the uncut surrounding grass, 
with all the imaginable hazards to public health,26 In Morogoro, mica 
deposits were scattered over the Uluguru hills and mountains, situated mostly 
in inhabited areas. Most labor was therefore within reasonable reach of their 
homes. Those who worked far from their homes were responsible for erecting 
their own grass huts near their places of work,27 
Labour inspectors admitted that workers' food rations were inadequate, 
monotonous and unnourishing, The standard ration at most of the Musoma mines 
consisted of a daily issue of maize meal, a weekly issue of beans, salt and 
sometimes groundnuts. If the employer shot a buck a Sunday issue of meat might 
be received,28 In 1935 a government officia'i complained of the Musoma m.ine 
owners: "there appears to be a belief among some of the smaller employers 
that, provided a native is given two pounds or so of maize or muhogo (cassava) 
meal all has been done which ought to be done, The laborer cooks this as best 
he may, or if firewood is not to hand, mixes it with water and eats it 
raw. 1129 In 1943 it was reported that rations in the Morogoro mica mining 
industry consisted of maize and cassava flour only. Fortunately, the 
recipients of this poor ration were able to return home over the weekends and 
supplement it with better food,30 
Although the Master and Native Servants Ordinance required that employers 
take care of their sick laborers, few of the smaller ones did, At. best 
medicalfacilities available at some of these mines consisted of a poorly 
equipped dispensary run by an unqualified, barely literate dispenser, At some 
mines the sick were attended either by the manager who kept "a very primitive 
assortment of drugs and bandages" at his house, or by the mine clerk who had 
only a first-aid kit in his office. Others gave no medical care of any kind, 
leaving their sick laborers to either seek traditional cure if they could get 
it or die,31 
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The positive aspect of life on the small mines is that in general life in 
the camps was not regimented. Government sometimes expressed disappointment 
that the camps were run on "extremely happy-go-lucky lines." Single women from 
the surrounding country slept with their boy friends in the camps. Trafficking 
in liquor was uncontrolled, and government authorities urged employers in vain 
to invoke the Native Liquor Ordinance and set up controlled liquor shops. As 
the mine owners provided no recreational amenities to their labor, they had no 
moral basis for restricting their workmen's 'social freedom•.32 
Generally speaking the larger mines, in the early stages of their 
development, provided conditions which were only marginally better than those 
on the small mines. Only when they had reached a full production stage, 
especially after World War II, did some of them provide a palpably better 
quality of life for their workers. The common feature of these mines is that 
prov1.s1.on of services to workers, especially housing, was organized on the 
basis of a 'colour-class complex'. Housing, medical services, recreational 
amenities and schools (where they were provided) were segregated on the basis 
of race and employment status. The best facilities were enjoyed by whites. 
Next came the Asians and then the 'senior' African employees, mainly clerks, 
supervisors and artisans. The predominant majority of the African workers 
received relatively inferior services. Among the latter, contract laborers 
fared worse. The social life of the African workers was manipulated and 
controlled to serve the interests of the employers. 
The 1939 labor inspector's report on conditions on the Musoma goldfield, 
already referred to, singled out for praise the Buhemba and Kiabakari mines. 
At Buhemba, where some 1,000 Africans were employed, there were about 300 
units of housing allocated according to the status of the workers. The 
mud-brick huts occupied by the low paid workers were found to be spacious, 
"remarkably clean and in very good repair." Higher grade workers occupied 
"real houses with galvanized roofs." At Kiabakari 20 married couples were 
provided with separate huts, an unusual feature of mine compound life at that 
time. Housing for European employees was assessed as superior to government 
quarters for colonial officials in many administrative centres. At both mines 
running water was readily available, and the compounds were kept clean by 
full-time sanitary squads. Hospital facilities were located on the premises 
and company transport was available to ferry serious cases to Musoma 
government hospital. The companies ran clubs where their workers could buy 
their traditional brew. Shopping facilities were also provided. Rations were 
judged to be sufficiently nourishing. Apart from the usual maize meal, beans 
and salt, a weekly issue of meat, sugar and fruit was a regular feature of the 
ration. Kiabakari operated an evening school which its workers attended on a 
voluntary basis and learned mainly the three Rs and elementary English.33 
Conditions, especially housing, at the Geita mine, the biggest gold mine 
in the territory, constituted an issue o.f frequent friction between Government 
and the Company. A visiting delegation of the Empire Parliamentary Association 
complained about overcrowding in the Geita laborers' huts. The delegation 
members were appalled when they observed that the laborers slept on the bare 
floor. 34 As late as 19 53 the ccxnpany' s Ridge-8 compound consisted of what 
the Deputy Labour Commissioner described as dilapidated mud and wattle 
circular huts. Construction of new mud-brick houses was progressing slowly, at 
the rate of three per month. The main compound at Geita consisted mostly of 
the standard corrugated iron rondavels with thatched roofs, constructed in the 
late 1930s.35 Except for some few workers in the supervisory category, 
married accommodation was inadequate. A newly appointed labor affairs adviser 
described workers' housing at Geita in 1952 as "frankly shocking," and 
although he recommended construction of new housing units, evidence based on 
11 
interviews with former workers at Geita indicates that no substantial number 
of new units were constructed.36 
The earliest dietary available for Geita is for the year 1948. It looks 
quite impressive. It consisted of a daily issue of maize meal, beans, 
groundnuts and sugar, and a weekly issue of vegetable oils, greens, salt, and 
meat (twice a week) .3 7 Single workers received cooked meals in a communal 
mess. However, oral sources are replete with complaints about sour flour and 
rotten beans being .a source of workers' frequent stomach ailments.38 A 
racially segregated hospital was built in the late 1930s and was manned by a 
full-time medical officer. Prophilactics against cerebro-spinal meningitis, 
malaria and pneumonia were administered regularly. Racially segregated 
recreational facilities were also provided by the company.39 
Conditions at the Mwadui diamond mine, which eventually became a model of 
labor management, did not improve appreciably until the mid-1950s. The 
original workers' housing consisted mainly of the standard circular huts which 
only began to be dismantled in 1951 when contruction of a new compound 
started. Early in 1952 the Labour Commissioner urged management to speed up 
construction of the new compound as the state of overcrowding in the old one 
was ''most undesirable." The new compound, completed in 1954, consisted of 
permanent brick-and-mortar units for single and married employees. Adequate 
kitchen facilities, and ablution and latrine accommodation, with running 
water, were provided.40 
By the late 1950s Mwadui was a fully fledged mining town modelled on the 
southern and central African experience. Besides the new compound, officially 
designated as African Township, there were housing units for senior African 
employees, Asian quarters and a European township. The European employees and 
their families had access to a club with such facilities as a swimming pool, a 
bar, indoor games, a cinema hall, a children's. park and a golf course. 
Facilities at the Asiatic club were rather inferior but still better than what 
was available for the Africans. Before 1960, when the African Township 
community centre was completed, the only recreational amenity available for 
the African workers was a company-run mapuya (local beer) club. Primary school 
education for employees' children and hospital services, including specialized 
treatment, were available on a racially segregated basis. Bus transport within 
the town was provided, and so were racially segregated shopping facilities. 
The rations, commuted to cash payment only in 1960, were reputedly 
nourishing.41 
Reports about relatively good living conditions on the bigger mines, which 
in any case were usually exaggerated by colonial officials sympathetic to 
management, are likely to obscure the fact that workers on these mines were 
subjected to various forms of social control, restriction on their freedoms, 
and mistreatment. In other words, the mineworkers were subjected to what some 
social scientists have characterized as extramural discipline which is imposed 
outside the bounds of the work place.42 We may attribute this 
'extramuralism' to three main factors: (1) the need to prevent theft of 
valuable minerals, especially gold and diamonds, (2) the desire to control 
behaviour on the part of the workmen that might adversely affect their work 
discipline and their productivity, and (3) the need to prevent the possibility 
of a breakdown in general order on the mine or, even more significantly, 
combination by the workers to put demands to, or even rebel against the 
authority of management. 
The denial of the mineworker' s freedom and his control were embodied in 
the administration of the compound under the direct control of the compound 
manager assisted by the compound police. Most compound managers were recruited 
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from Southern Africa and they manifested the same kinds of beliefs about 
African labor that were prevalent in that part of the continent, Even colonial 
officials admitted that compound managers' attitudes towards Africans left 
much to be desired,43 A district officer described the compound manager at 
Mpanda as an "irascible disciplinarian" who had "a peculiar mind towards the 
African, conducive to believing that all and sundry, unless kept so strictly 
controlled and disciplined that they can hardly think, are thieves, liars and 
vagabonds, 1144 A police commissioner was reluctant to give compound managers 
powers of search without warrant (which they exercised, anyway) because, he 
feared, they were "usually a 'tough I type of individual, impatient of the law 
and its safeguards. 1145 The compound police, recruited mainly from among the 
ranks of ex-KAR soldiers, constituted an instrument of terror on the mines. 
They were identified not only by their uniforms but also by what one labor 
inspector described as ''vicious looking" whips which they carried as "a badge 
of authority. 11 In fact they often used these whips against the workers and, 
although this was illegal, they usually got away with it, Their powers of 
search and arrest were virtually unlimited, The compound sergeant major tried 
simple cases with the help of the tribal elders,46 
The compound was a place where the worker enjoyed no privacy and little 
freedom of movement, In their overcrowded huts, the workers could be searched 
any time, Up to the early 1950s female resident.a of Mwadui wanting to go out 
of the enclosed mine were allegedly searched for hidden diamonds even in t.heir 
private parts. New recruits at Mwadui could not get out of the mine until they 
had been there for at least three months, Even then, they could only go out on 
the weekends, There were restrictions on receiving visitors both at Mwadui and 
at Geita. A complicated and highly restrictive pass system of getting visitors 
into Mwadui was in force, and at Geita unmarried women were not allowed into 
the compound. Controlled drinking hours at the company-run beer clubs were 
strictly enforced, Geita employees who wanted to brew beer in their 
company-owned quarters had to obtain a special license from management at the 
cost of sh.2/= each time, Drinking parties at such places were closely watched 
by the compound police,47 
Restrictions on contract labor, the pariah group of the mine compound, 
were even more stringent, They tended to live in separate units, either in 
barrack-type buildings or in circular huts where the state of overcrowding was 
above average. They were constantly herded to ensure against their desertion, 
Whereas 'voluntary' labor at Geita was, on arrival, given some measure of 
choice on the nature of their job, manamba (contract) labor was given no such 
choice. Once recruited on contract, a worker at Geita could not marry until 
the end of his contract. No wonder that cases of adultery, involving fellow 
workers' wives, and rape of girls in the surrounding country, reached epidemic 
proportions, 48 
A newly appointed 'Native Labour Adviser' at Geita remarked in 1952 that 
construction of decent housing for workers was in itself insufficient, He 
argued: 
A house: a collection of bricks and mortar with a roof 
over it is a useless - even a dangerous thing, unless it 
is merely incidental to the establishment of a happy 
community. More human degradation is concentrated in a 
tenement room than in any rural shack, We should aim at 
the African housing at the Geita being so planned that 
satisfactory hygienic housing is supplied with a socially 
well organized community which is essentially Afarican in 
its behaviour pattern and conduct.49 
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His "socially well organized connnunity" was the compound where housing was 
allocated on the basis of workers' ethnic groups. Each group was housed 
separately in a cluster of huts under the leadership of a company-appointed 
tribal elder or headman who not only mediated in the disputes among his people 
but also served as an important link between them and the mine management. The 
Mwadui mine managed its compound on similar lines. One important institution 
of the tribal compound was the evening tribal dance. 
AB I have argued elsewhere, the tribal compound, which sought to tie the 
worker to traditional institutions, was, objectively, a subtle form of social 
control which held in check the emergence of group consciousness beyond the 
tribe. It helped management to keep the workers divided, and the former must 
have quietly relished the frequent inter-tribal fights, their disturbance of 
the peace notwithstanding.SO 
To many workers, however, who found themselves among strangers in a 
strange place, the tribal compound served the function of a mutual aid 
society. At Geita, for example, the company simply buried the dead; it never 
informed the victims' relatives. Fellow tribesmen usually volunteered to do 
that, and to return home whatever personal effects were left by the 
deceased.51 
Very often, the so-called perquisites received by the workers were often 
meant to elicit their loyalty to management and to encourage them to work 
harder. Food rations constitute a pertinent case in point. Following upon the 
reconnnendations of the Native Labour Adviser in 1952, Geita mine eventually 
issued rations to workers' families. The maximum ration issued was for one 
wife and two children. Available evidence indicates that absenteeism and 
loafing were lowest among married workers who could not forgo their food 
rations for fear of starving their families. Since families of hospitalized 
employees received no rations, married workers would avoid hospitalization as 
much as· they possibly could, suffering, as it were, with suppressed 
bitterness.51 
Living Conditions on the Alluvial Mine Fields 
Alluvial mining took place on the Karagwe tinfield in northwestern 
Tanganyika and on the Lupa goldfield in southwestern Tanzania. Because 
alluvia_l mining did not require much capital investment in mining equipment, 
it was an appropriate type of enterprise for men of small means. It tended to 
attract 'petty capitalists' who had failed to make it elsewhere, for example 
in planting, farming or trading. Their weakness as entrepreneurs easily 
reflected itself in the depressed and depressing conditions which their 
employees had to endure. 
The Karagwe tinfield was discovered in 1924. Until the end of World War II 
when the Kyerwa Syndicate, the major firm on the field, embarked on a major 
development of the_ lode deposits under its claims, more than half of the tin 
won on the field was from alluvial deposits. An observer in 1940 remarked that 
most of the 62 employers on the field started work "literally without a penny 
in their pockets" and carried on from month to month on the results of the 
previous one. A couple of bad months, the observer assessed, would put most of 
them out of action. Most worked other people's claims on 'tributory' 
arrangements. 
A tributor bore all the costs of production, including acqui.n.ng and 
maintaining all tools and equipment; recruiting, maintaining and paying labor; 
and costs incurred by the tin buyer, for example royalties, freight and 
insurance. In addition, he surrendered 20 per cent of the gross value of the 
tin to the claim-holder. There were even sub-tributors who worked ground 
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allotted to them by the tributors and paid an agreed proportion of the gross 
value of the tin won to the tributors who in turn paid the agreed tribute on 
this tin to the claim-holder. The absentee claim holder, who did nothing and 
lived in the relative comfort of Bukoba town, received free money while the 
tributors and sub-tributors bore all these costs. Moreover, tributors were 
haunted by a sense of insecurity as tribute arrangements could be terminated 
any time. Tributors were therefore extremely cost conscious, a fact which was 
reflected both in the manner in which they worked the deposits and in how they 
treated their labor. They tended to rob the richest portion of a claim, 
skipping low grade ground. They were invariably bad employers. A government 
officer's description of these people in 1940 could not have been more 
succinct: "Tributors, working from hand to mouth in most cases, skimp their 
respsonsibilities to labor in regard· to housing, food and medical attention, 
in an effort to offset the tribute payment. 1153 
Government was seriously concerned about labor conditions on the tinfield 
which assumed scandalous proportions. Several inquiries were made between 1938 
and the end of the War but little happened by way of improvement. In the 
majority of cases the laborers had to erect their own grass huts where they 
lived in overcrowded conditions. Sanitation was completely neglected. The food 
rations were described by a labor officer as "poor, unnourishing, monotonous 
and inadequate." Every laborer received one and a half to two pounds of maize 
meal and a small tin of beans daily, plus a twice weekly small supply of salt. 
The more generous employer might occasionally issue a plug of tobacco. The 
policy was "no work no rations" and· so no rations were issued on ·sundays, and 
the sick were usually never fed. Often many workers absented themselves from 
work while they went to look for food in the neighbouring villages. 
A labor officer remarked in 1938 that the neglect of sick laborers in 
Karagwe was "the outstanding feature to be regretted." "If a man becomes ill, 11 
observed another colonial officer two years later, "he must in most camps get 
well himself or get out, if necessary in a shroud." Few employers stocked any 
medicines or dressings, and the nearest dispensary at Kaisho was anywhere 
between 10 and 40 miles from the tin workings. When accidents occurred, the 
injured were dumped in a passing lorry and sent to Bukoba government hospital, 
100 miles away, "if they are sufficiently ill to warrant this concession." A 
. Government dispensary on the field ·was only put up in 1943. Few employers ever 
gave food to sick laborers. In most cases, the sick depended for their 
sustenance upon the generosity of their hut mates. 
Cases of default in payment of wages were quite frequent. It was common 
for workers to be owed up to four months I worth of wages and sometimes they 
were· never paid anything. Many workers were often cheated. Merali Shariff, an 
Asian tributor, would sometimes pretend that he was giving some of his workers 
a canoe ride across the Kagera. He would then leave them on the Ugandan side 
of the river thus disposing of them unpaid. In some cases workers would 
receive temptingly big advances on their first card, and that was all the 
wages they received .54 The Karagwe tinfield established such a bad 
reputation that it always had a serious labor shortage. Mo.st of its labor 
supply came from the depressed Belgian territoiry of Ruanda-Urundi. 
By the late 192 Os the Lupa goldfield, discovered in 1922, was already 
producing 85 per cent of the colony's annual gold output. The onset of the 
Depression, which gave rise to the international abandonment of the gold 
standard which, in turn, triggered off a price boom for gold, had dramatic 
results for the wpa. The number of claim-holders on· the field rose by 200 per 
cent in the second half of 1931. Between 1931 and 1936 the number of diggers 
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increased from 300 to 1,000, and their laborers from 5,000 to 20,000. 
Expatriate farmers, planters and traders in Tanganyika and the neighbouring 
c'olonies who had fallen on evil days in the Depression flocked to the Lupa "in 
the hope of being able to tide over the present bad times,." A significant 
proportion of them were 'poor whites', indigent Boers from rural South Africa, 
under threat of proletarianization. About half of the field's labor force came 
from the colonies of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, especially the latter 
whose copper industry had been devastated by the Depression. They walked 
hundreds of miles through tough country to get to the Lupa.55 , 
As much as 95 per cent or more of the gold produced on the Lupa in the 
1930s came from alluvial deposits. This was an industry which was easy to get 
into because it did not require large amounts of capital. It attracted 
transient characters who simply came to try their luck as well as a few "down 
and outs" who managed to eke out an existence. Alluvial diggers were 
characteristically a 'nomadic race', a factor dictated by the nature of 
alluvial mining. A rumor of a minor strike of gold in some other place, was 
usually followed by a ,,stampede to the new locality. On average, diggers made 5 
to 6 moves a year, taking along with them, of course, their labor force. 
Two observers aptly described most of the Lupa gold diggers as "squatters 
in the most literal sense of the word, whose boys may or may not ever see any 
of the money promised them as wages, and who are quite unable to provide 
proper housing, sanitation or medical facilities." Labourers lived, in most 
cases, in temporary shacks where sanitation was conspicuously absent. The 
surroundings, including the river banks and pot holes, were continually 
fouled. What saved the population from a dysentry epidemic, observed a visitor 
to the field, was the "universal habit of drinking tea. 1156 
In general the diggers, these sma 11 men, ''whose economic horizon stretches 
no further than the day after tomorrow," frequently ran into problems in 
trying to make both ends meet. Their laborers were easily the victims of this 
situation as the diggers tried to minimize costs. They paid the lowest wage 
rates in the mining industry. In many cases the rate actually paid was lower 
than the verbal rate promised at, the time of recruitment. 'No gold no day' was 
the accepted motto of the field. Labourers who returned with no gold at the 
end of the working day were credited with no wages. Nor were the sick paid any 
wages or given any fbod. In their issue of food rations, the diggers 
sedulously adhered to the standard trio of maize meal, beans and salt. Some 
even had difficulties buying enough supplies to feed their labor. Nutritional 
deficiency diseases, notably scurvy, were rampant on the field. In the late 
1930s Government campaigned among the diggers in vain for improved labor 
,feeding standards. Medical care for labor was invariably not given as hardly 
any of the diggers could afford it. It was not until 1936, when Government 
built a hospital and three dispensaries on the field, that laborers could get 
some medical attention.57 
The greatest headache for government authorities was the non-payment of 
wages, a common phenomenon on the Lupa. By nature of alluvial gold mining, 
most diggers were gamblers and their laborers per force gambled with them. The 
average digger tended to take on more laborers than he could pay in the hope 
that he might make a lucky strike. More often than not such hopes never 
materialized. Cases of unpaid wages occupied nearly 90 per cent of the labor 
officer's time. In 1937, he received complaints against 539 employers, 
involving sh. 26,708/= of unpaid wages some of which had been accumulated in 
previous years. Some diggers used to present their labor with I. 0. U. chits 
which were often not worth more than the pieces of paper on which the 
commitments were written. Others, faced with large bills of unpaid wages, 
allowed their rations to run out for days, thus getting rid of their labor. 
Some diggers, especially after 1938 when gold became increasingly difficult to 
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find, would depart at the dead of night for the neighboring colonies and leave 
their labor unpaid.58 
There is need to explain why, despite such unfavourable conditions, people 
still sought employment on the Lupa. The explanation is multifaceted. In the 
first place, work on the Lupa was for many the only way in which they could 
earn their tax money. This was particularly so in the Depression, especially 
in the case of workers from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. The second 
attraction was the relative freedom of the worker whose work on the field was 
usually unsupervised and who, in his informal camp life, did not have to 
endure the rigours of compound life. Thirdly, for those who were well versed 
in the art, was the attraction of illegal gold dealing, an opportunity to make 
a fortune at a stroke. Fourthly, was the nature of work in alluvial mining 
which, unlike reef mining, did not involve dangerous or fatal accidents. 
Finally, the general atmosphere of the field offered a social life that had 
many interesting aspects to it. This latter point needs elaboration. 
In its heyday the Lupa attracted not only diggers and laborers but also 
settled and itinerant traders, butchers, petty craftsmen, and a section of the 
population which "throve apparently on nothing." The latter constituted the 
goldfield's floating population which included liquor traffickers, 
prostitutes, gold smugglers, and the genuinely unemployed. A visiting cleric 
in 1938 was horrified to discover that, although the majority of the Africans 
had no apparent occupation, "several drinking booths do a roaring trade, and 
loose women haunt these dens of vice in great numbers. 1159 The field's five 
or so major centers were towns in their own right. 
This thinly veiled Lupa underworld was a subject of concern not only among 
the 'men of God' but also among the employers. The latter's worry was not so 
much about liquor traffickers or women of easy virtue as about the illegal 
gold dealers, burglars and all those whose activities constituted a threat to 
property. As early as 1832 the Lupa Gold Diggers Association urged government 
to turn the Lupa which, they alleged, was a place of "unrebuked license", into 
a controlled area. Government easily obliged by passing in the same year the 
Mining (Controlled Areas) Ordinance which, among other things, provided for 
obliging all Africans on the Lupa to carry entry permits. A permanent 
administrative post was also established on the field in 1934. The diggers 
remained unsatisfied, alleging that the law had many loopholes. In 1934, with 
the backing of the Provincial Commissioner and the local police chief, the 
Diggers Association called for a fully-fledged pass system with a centralized 
fingerprint identification bureau. The Governor found the demand objectionable 
as it would constitute "an unwarranted interference with the personal liberty 
of thousands in an effort to secure advantage for a small number of 
employers. 1160 Imposing restrictions of this sort on people scattered over a 
sparsely populated 1,000 square miles was, in any case, not a practical 
proposition. People came and went as they wished and casual existence remained· 
the outstanding feature of the Lupa goldfield. 
The Role of the State 
There may be a point in E.P. Thompson's contention that 
those moments in which governing institutions appear as 
the direct, and unmediated organs of a 'ruling class' are 
exceedingly rare and transient. More often these institu-
tions operate with a good deal of autonomy, and sometimes 
with distinct interests of their own, within a general 
context of class power which prescribes the limits beyond 
which this autonomy cannot with safety be stretched.61 
17 
In the same vein Berman and Lonsdale have taken to task the reductionist 
'instrumental' analysis of the colonial state as the subordinate 'agent' of 
the bourgeoisie based mainly in the metropole. They argue that although the 
colonial state provides a political framework within which capital reproduces 
and augments itself, it· (the state) needs to distance itself from the 
immediate process of production in order to be able to rule with the consent 
of the governed and "maintain or renovate the structures of domination and 
accumulation more generally. 11 The state may therefore sometimes act against 
the immediate interests of an economically dominant class.62 
Whereas Berman and Lonsdale have introduced an important corrective to the 
reductionist interpretation of the colonial state as the unmediated agent of 
the metropolitan bourgeoisie, their view is in need of modification. A quest 
for the consent of the governed in a colonial situation would be a 
contradiction in terms. There are, in my opinion, two basic explanations 
behind state intervention on behalf of the workers within the framework of 
colonialism. First, it seeks to minimize social discontent and therefore 
forestall popular disturbances the suppression of which would be both 
expensive and politically damaging. Secondly, state intervention would many 
times be aimed at dampening outside political criticisms, regarding colonial 
oppression and exploitation, emanating both from diplomatic or international 
circles and from liberal politicians in the mother country. 
The colonial state in Tanganyika intervened in different ways on behalf of 
workers in the mining industry to regulate conditions under which they worked 
and lived. The intervention took many forms: legislation, enforcement of the 
legislation, labor and mine inspection, providing advice to employers on the 
care of labor, and even direct material contribution in the form, for example, 
of providing medical services where employers were not able to do so. 
It is important to bear in mind, however, that the colonial state was not 
a monolithic phenomenon. There were within it contradictory tendencies which 
defined the manner of its intervention. One discerns three main levels of 
contradiction. The first was the division between, on the one hand, the 
provincial and distinct administration, the 'men on the spot', in touch with 
employers and their workmen on the minefields and, on the other, the central 
bureaucracy in Dar-es-Salaam. The former came under more direct pressure from 
the employers with whom they rubbed shoulders in the local European clubs and 
with whom they tended to sympathize. The latter had a rather wider horizon, 
not only with an interest in.profitability of mining or in internal order but 
also with an eye on international opinion and the politics of the mother 
country. The second form of contradiction was at the level of departmental 
interests. For example, medical officers, concerned about the heal th and 
nutritional standards of the wage earning population, sometimes found 
themselves at odds with officials of the department of mines who tended to be 
more concerned about the profitability of mining and therefore to acquiesce in 
the employers' mistreatment of labor in respect of feeding, medical care, 
wages and so on. At the height of mine labor shortage in 1935, the Director of 
Lands and Mines warned against "excessively high wages" as low cost of 
production was essential for attracting mining capital into the country. 63 
Finally, there were sometimes subtle ideological differences among individual 
members of the colonial regime. The differences emerged in the form of debates 
between liberals and conservatives, the latter tending to advocate the point 
of view of the cost-conscious employer and the former expressing concern over 
crude forms of labor exploitation which offended their liberal con.science. All 
these influences were brought. to bear upon the character of state 
intervention, though the nature of their impacts is difficult to pin down. 
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The principal labor legislation governing relations between .labor and 
capital in the colony was the 1923 Master and Native Servants Ordinance. Among 
other things, the ordinance defined employment as a contract between the two 
parties, spelling out rights and obligations on both sides and providing for 
penalties to be incurred in case of breach of the terms of the contract. The 
obligations of the employers in respect of payment, housing, feeding and 
medical care for their labor were clearly spelt out. Failing to carry out any 
of these things constituted an offence punishable by law. 
Both in its formulation and in its implementation or enforcement, the 
Ordinance was found to. be wanting as far as the welfare of the workers was 
concerned. As to its formulation three examples will suffice. Labour 
inspectors found out that, according to the High Court interpretation of 
Section 37 (1), they could not institute proceedings to compel employers to 
improve labor conditions. Complaints ·could only be lodged by the workers 
themselves who were usually ignorant of their legal rights, expressed in 
alanguage which they did not understand, and who, in any case, would be 
dissuaded from seeking legal redress by the terror of their employers.64 
An impecunious employer defaulting in payment of wages was not liable for 
conviction if it was established that at the commencement of work he had 
reasonable grounds to believe that he would be in a position to pay his 
workers at the expiration of their contract. Many diggers on the Lupa were 
able to exploit this loophole in the law.65 
In 1943 Government expressed concern over the safety of workers at a lead 
smelting plant that was in the process of construction at Mpanda mine. 
Investigations were made into the ways in which workers might be compensated 
in case of lead poisoning. The 1920 Mining Ordinance provided for enforcement 
of safety measures, but there wa·s no legal provision for compensation for 
contracting an occupational disease. Compensation was provided for only in the 
case of an accident. Government would not be drawn into introducing a new, 
more comprehensive, law regarding workmen's compensation which, they said, 
they were not in a position to enforce.66 
Even in cases of employers' violation of the law, the forces of law and 
order sometimes proved to be miserably ineffective. In 1939 S.P. Aay, a Dutch 
tin mine operator in Karagwe, openly assaulted his workmen by beating them 
with a stick and setting his dogs on them. The incident was reported to the 
police but no action was taken because, in the words of a colonial labor 
officer "it is a difficult matter for a native policeman to interfere between 
a European and his labor. 116 7 
Despite such apparent weaknesses in the law and its implementation 
regarding the welfare of wage labor, Government was quite sensitive to 
criticisms of neglect, whether they were internal or external. Many inquiries 
on which so much of our information in this paper is based were instituted by 
Government in response to allegations of deteriorating conditions on the 
mines. These enquiries, however, were not followed up with decisive action. 
Government action was largely constrained by their desire to maintain the 
profitability of the mining industry and to protect the small mine operators, 
the predominant majority in the industry, from being squeezed out of mining. 
The outbreak of scurvy and other nutritional deficiency diseases on the 
. Lupa led the Government to launch a campaign in 1936 to improve the standards 
of feeding labor. Efforts were made to grow citrus fruits and green vegetables 
in the area, and employers were encouraged to buy them to be able to include 
antiscorbutics in their rations for labor. Some reef mine operators responded 
favorably but almost none of the alluvial diggers did. Propaganda was 
disseminated all over the field in the form of 'Medical Pamphlets' containing 
information on balanced diets. The pamphlets argued that, in the final 
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analysis, a balanced diet for the worker would benefit the employer as labor 
would become more productive. The nutrition campaign, which smacks of 
government by crisis, fell on deaf ears. When employers did not respond, 
Government toyed with the idea of a compulsory scale of rations but finally 
dropped it under pressure from the provincial administration in Mbeya who 
argued that a compulsory scale of rations would be difficult to enforce and, 
more seriously, would involve small employers in extra expense thus driving 
them to the wall.68 
The non-payment of wages on the Lupa by some of the small employers was, 
as we have seen, another ugly feature of the minesfield. The Briltish colonial 
office intervened in 1937 by asking the Tanganyika government to look into the 
possibility of forcing holders of prospecting. rights on the Lupa to make 
security deposits with government to cover their wage liabilities. The Mbeya 
Provincial Commissioner, under pressure from the Lupa Diggers Association, 
advised against the suggestion on grounds that, if implemented, the system 
would ruin or drive away many small diggers who had never defaulted. He even 
invented some casuistry to rationalize the non-payment of wages: "many natives 
like the easy life and are prepared to accept their luck as good gamblers 
do. "The central government and, apparently, the Colonial office in London 
easily accepted these arguments. 69 The Tanganyika mining sector, moderate as 
it was, was a vital part of the colonial economy. Nothing, it seems, would be 
done which would jeopardize production in this sector - not even if it was in 
the interest of the mineworkers. 
Conclusion. 
The evidence against the validity of the paternalist model of colonial 
labor relations is incontrovertible. Colonial enterprises, whether in mining, 
agriculture or trade, were set up in order to earn profits. In pursuit of this 
end, minimization of production costs, probably the most crucial of which was 
expenditure on labor, constituted a major area of entrepreneurial attention. 
The impact of this on the condition of mine labor has, one hopes, been clearly 
illustrated. Employers in some cases were prepared to manipulate 
pre-capitalist features of colonial society, especially the absence of the 
cash nexus and the taming influence of traditional authority, to maximize 
returns from labor. The uncritical observer might read as paternalism what in 
essence was a crafty exercise in social control - in the interest of capital 
accumulation. This exercise was based not on sentimental feelings or on any 
sense of social obligation but on calculation. 
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